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CONIENTS
THE SCRECHTER CAsE-A RESTATEMfENT OF FAnitAM PRIncILEs.-The
Schechter Case' is* now history. Seldom has a decision of the Supreme Court
been preceded by more heated debate pro2 and con,3 attended with greater
expectancy, and followed by more vehement argumentation. 4 Interest in the
outcome was by no means confined to the legal profession; the humble Shop-
keeper was as deeply concerned as the great corporation.
The problem immediately before the Court concerned the code provisions of
the National Industrial Recovery Act. Section 3r of that Act authorized the
President to approve and promulgate codes of fair competition under which
the various industries would thereafter be required to operate. Under this
authority, the President approved the Live Poultry Code of the New York
Metropolitan Area.6 An indictment was brought, charging, inter alia, violation
1. A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 55 Sup. Ct. 837 (1935).
2. Many urged that the control of industry as outlined by the N. I. R. A. was within
the scope of the commerce clause. Wahrenbrock, Federal Anti-Trust Law and The National
Industrial Recovery Act (1933) 31 AicE. L. RLv. 1009; Hervey, Some Constitutional
Aspects of the National Industrial Recovery Act (1933) S TmwrLrE L. Q. 3; Stem, That
Commerce Which Concerns More States Than One (1934) 47 HAnv. L. R1v. 1335.
3. That the N.I.R.A. was not within the powers granted to Congress under the com-
merce clause: '(1933) 47 HAxv. L. REv. 85; Elder, Some Constitutional Aspects of Ise
National Industrial Recovery Act (1934) 28 ILT. L. REv. 636. Many forcsaw that the
N.I.RA. would be held unconstitutional on the ground of undue delegation of power;
Frankham, An Analysis of the Delegation of Power in Some of the Recent Congressioral
Enactments (1933) 3 Baoomyur L. Pv. 38; Hervey, Some Constitutional Aspects of the
National Industrial Recovery Act (1933) 8 Tsan'rx L. Q. 3; Dickinson, The Major Isues
Presented by the Industrial Recovery Act (1933) 33 COL. L. R.v. 1095; Handler, The
National Industrial Recovery Act (1933) 19 A. B. A. J. 440; Maurer, Some Constitutional
Aspects of the National Industrial Recovery Act and the Agricultural Adjustment Act (1934)
22 GEo. L. '. 207; Carpenter, Constitutionality of the National Industrial Recovery Act
and the Agricultural Adjustment Act (1934) 7 So. CamP. L. Rlv. 125.
4. Fuchs, A Postscript--The Schechter Case (1935) 20 ST. Louis L. Pv. 297; (1935)
35 CoL. L. REv. 934; (1935) 9 TEsr E L. Q. 451; (1935) 33 Mcmi. L. Rlv. 1254.
5. 48 STAT. 195, 15 U. S. C. A. § 701 (1933).
6. The Code included in its scope the five boroughs of New York City, four other
,ounties of New York, one in Connecticut and two in New Jersey. It contained eight
articles headed respectively: Purposes, Definition, Hours, Wages, General Labor Provisions,
Administration, Trade Practice Provisions, General. Its declared purpose was "to effect
the policies of title I of the NJ.RA:' The "industry" was defined as including "every
person engaged in the business of selling, purchasing for resale, transporting or handling
and/or slaughtering live poultry, from the time such poultry comes into the New York
metropolitan area to the time it is first sold in slaughtered form,' and such "related
branches" as may from time to time be included by amendment. The Code fixed the
number of hours for work days, "no employee, with certain exceptions, being permitted
to work over forty hours per week" and the minimum standard of wages (no employce to
be paid less than fifty cents per hour). It prohibits the employment of those under sxteen
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of the minimum wage, maximum hour and "straight killing" provisions of the
Poultry Code. The defendants who operated wholesale poultry slaughterhouse
markets in New York and purchased from commission men for sale and resale
to local retailers, were convicted for violations of the Code and for conspiracy
to commit such violations. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the con-
viction on the counts charging infringement of the provisions relating to mini-
mum wages and hours of labor, holding these not within the congressional
power of regulation. On appeal to the Supreme Court the reversal of the con-
viction was upheld on two grounds: first, that the Code had been adopted
pursuant to an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power by Congress,
and second, that the attempted regulation exceeded the powers granted to
Congress under the commerce clause.
Delegation of Power
In holding that Congress had unconstitutionally delegated its legislative power
to the President, the Court invoked a doctrine,8 traditionally familiar0 but never,
prior to the decision in the "hot oil" case, 10 successfully resorted to as a ground
for invalidating an act of Congress. The question of undue delegation of power
to the President was not litigated in the Supreme Court until 1813,11 and did
not make its reappearance for more than a half century. 12 But thereafter the
doctrine received frequent consideration in attacks both against acts of Con-
years of age. It assures to employees the right of "collective bargaining" and freedom of
choice with respect to labor organizations. It fixes the minimum number of employees
who shall be employed by slaughterhouse operators. The seventh article, containing "trade
practice provision" prohibits various practices which are said to constitute "unfair methods
of competition."
7. "Straight killing" is defined in the Code as "the practice of requiring persons pur-
chasing poultry for resale to accept the run of'any half coop, coop or coops as purchased
by slaughterhouse operators, except for culls."
8. The doctrine was the subject of much discussion in the Constitutional Convention
but it is interesting to note that it does not appear in the Constitution except by implica-
tion from the fact that the three powers are there separately treated and vested in three
distinct branches of the federal government. In actuality, a complete segregation of
powers has never obtained, for example, the President exercises a legislative function when
he vetoes Acts of Congress, the Senate exercises judicial power when it sits as a court of
impeachment. The Supreme Court legislates when it enunciates rules of practice.
9. That Congress may leave to selected persons the formulation of rules within prescribed
limits was always well understood. Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Goodrich Transit Co.,
224 U. S. 194 (1912); United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U. S. 77
(1932). The rule concerning delegation is well known and stems from the maxim ddcgata
potestas non potest delegari.
10. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935).
11. Cargo of the Brig Aurora, 11 U. S. 382 (1813).
12. Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1892). During the intervening period the Supreme
Court determined favorably on questions involving delegation of power to the courts, Way-
man v. Southard, 23 U. S. 1 (1825), and to a state railroad commission, Railroad Comm.
Cases, 116 U. S. 307 (1886).
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gress 3 and against statutes of the state legislatures.1 4 Rulings of the Interstate
Commerce Commission have been repeatedly challenged on this ground.1 But
in each instance the Court, while reiterating the doctrine that legislative power
may not be delegated, found that in the particular case under consideration it
had not been violated. The doctrine was to win its first victory in the case
which struck the presaging blow at the citadel of the New Deal.1 0
While the "hot oil" cases did not penetrate to the very heart of the N. I. R. A.,
the code-making power, its "bone and sinew", was involved in the Schcchltcr
Case. The pivotal issue in the latter case focussed on the power delegated to
the President to approve and promulgate codes. Was it merely that required
to administer policies defined by Congress, or was it a sweeping delegation of
power without adequate circumscription? Chief Justice Hughes, citing the
"hot oil" case, observes that there the subject of the statutory prohibition was
defined and the objection was merely with respect to the range of discretion
given to the President, while here no limits were set to the exercise of the
President's discretion, which, in approving or prescribing codes and thus enact-
ing laws for the government of trade and industry throughout the country, was
virtually unfettered.j 7
13. Ex porte Kollock, 165 U. S. 526 (1897) (an act requiring containers of olcomar-
gerine to be marked as prescribed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue); Buttlield
v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470 (1904) (an act requiring that all tea imported should conform
with standards to be established by the Secretary of the Treasury); Union Bridge Co. v.
United States, 204 U. S. 364 (1907); Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U. S.
177 (1910) ; United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506 (1911) (a statute giving the Secretary
of Agriculture certain powers with respect to authorized reserves); First Nat. Bank v.
Fellows, 244 U. S. 416 (1917) (Federal Reserve Act); Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S.
366 (1918) (Selective Service Act); United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U. S. 1
(1926) (Trading with the Enemy Act); Hampton Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S.
394 (1928) (the flexible provisions of the Tariff Act of 1922) ; United States v. Shreveport
Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U. S. 77 (1932) (the Pure Food and Drug Act).
14. Statutes relating to railroad and utility regulation: Reagan v. Farmers Loan & Trust
Co., No. 1, 154 U. S. 362 (1894); Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 211 U. S. 265
(1908); Honolulu Rapid Transit Land Co. v. Hawaii, 211 U. S. 282 (1903); Oklahoma
Operating Co. v. Love, 252 U. S. 331 (1920). To the inspection of coal mines: Consolidated
Coal Co. v. Illinois, 185 U. S. Z03 (1902). The taxation of railroads: Michigan Cent. R.
Co. v. Powers, 201 U. S. 245 (1906). The inspection of illuminating oil: Red "C" Oil
Mfg. Co. v. Board of Agriculture, 222 U. S. 380 (1912). The licensing of dentists: Douglas
v. Noble, 261 U. S. 165 (1923). A motor vehicle act: Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374
(1932).
15. See for example: Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U. S.
194 (1912); Inter-mountain Rate Cases, 234 U. S. 476 (1914); Avent v. United States,
266 U. S. 127 (1924); Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 284
U. S. 370 (1932); New York Cent. Securities Corp. v. United States, 287 U. S. 12 (1932).
16. (1934) 4 FoRanAii L. Rrv. 341.
17. The Court found that Section 3 of the N.I.R.A. authorized prohibition which 'would,
in the opinion of the President, bring about the rehabilitation of industry, and that the only
limits on his discretion were (1) that the proposed code be truly representative and impose
19351
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This conclusion, however, is by no means so consequential nor will it effect
such serious repercussions as may, perhaps, the Court's definition of "interstate
commerce", in positing as the second ground of the opinion the premise that
the transactions involved did not come within the scope of the "commerce
clause" of the Constitution. Conceivably, statutes might have been enacted, and
existing statutes redrafted to meet the requirement as to delegated authority
but this opinion strikes not only at the N. I. R. A., it strikes at the most historic
well-spring of federal power.
Interstate Commerce
The "commerce clause"18 ranks second in importance only to the "due
process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as the outstanding constitutional
recourse, although its full import was not revealed before the year 182410 with
the case of Gibbons v. Ogden.20 The clause found its inception in the endeavor
of the framers of the Constitution to preclude for all time the enervating effect
of conflict nurtured by commercial jealousies among the erstwhile colonial en-
tities. Indeed the chief and possibly entire purpose of the clause was to
empower the federal government to prevent states' interference with the freedom
of commercial intercourse. 21 However, as has been clearly demonstrated, "The
reasons which may have caused the framers of the Constitution to repose the
power to regulate interstate commerce in Congress do not, however, affect or
limit the extent of the power itself." 22  Marshall had already ruled"  that
"commerce" is not merely "traffic" in its primary significance, it is also "inter-
course" and hence comprehends "transportation. '24  With this enlarged inter-
pretation of the intended purpose and scope of the clause as a point of departure,
the Court built up a conception of the word "regulate", discarding Marshall's
definition as the power to "govern", and forged a new instrument of federal
control by construing the clause as a grant of power to "foster, protect and
promote commerce." 25  Still greater vistas of regulation were opened by the
no inequitable restriction on admission to membership, (2) that it be not monopolistic nor
operate to oppress small enterprises, (3) that it tend to effectuate the policy of N.I.R.A.
which is to promote trade and industry. Counting these limitations no restriction, the
Court concluded that the discretion of the President was completely unconfined "to make
whatever laws he thinks may be needed or advisable for the rehabilitation and expansion
of trade or industry."
18. U. S. CoNsr. Art. I, § 8. Congress is given power to "regulate commerce with
foreign nations and among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes."
19. Before 1840, this clause was involved in but five cases in the Supreme Court.
20. 22 U. S. 1 (1824).
21. WILouGHBY, THE CoN sT-TONAxL LAW oF TnE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1929) 721.
22. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 211, 228 (1899).
23. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S. 1 (1824).
24. See CoRwIx, THE TWmIGHT oF THE Suv -R COURT (1934) 19, for a criticism
of the conflict resulting from this dual interpretation.
25. Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U. S. 20 (1911); Second Employers Liability
Cases, 223 U. S. 1 (1912); Houston E. & W. Texas Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342
(1914); Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332 (1917); United States v. Fergen, 280 U. S. 199 (1919);
Railroad Comm. of Wis. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 257 U. S. 563 (1922).
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flexible interpretation of "commerce'--as "transportation" 20 thus embracing
such non-commercial activities as driving sheep across state lines,21 carrying
goods from one state to another for personal use, and in a private vehicle,-
as well as by means of a common carrier, -0 crossing a bridge from state to
state,30 and transporting a woman across state lines for immoral purposes. '
The breadth of federal powers has not been "confined to the instrumentalities
of commerce known or in use when the Constitution was adopted, but they
keep pace with the progress of the country, and adapt themselves to the new
developments of time and circumstances. '32 It has thus been extended to
industries unknown and unforeseen when the Constitution was framed, such,
for example, as the wireless, radio, telephone and aeroplane industries. So too,
the Court's conception of "commerce among the states" has expanded to en-
compass transportation within a state of goods destined for or brought from
another state,-3 as well as the sale by sample of goods to be brought from
another state,34 and the purchase of goods within a state for transportation to
another state.-- These results were achieved mainly in cases involving measures
of state taxation, and the introduction of the "Original Package Doctrine" 30
brought with it the further rule that the sale of goods coming into the state
in the original package was the subject of federal and not state jurisdiction.
Subtle refinements and meticulous distinctions have followed in the train of
attempts to define the constituent elements of the "original package." 31 Fre-
26. See Willoughby, op. cit. sup7a note 21, at 733 for a criticism of the Court's ex-
pansion of the inherent meaning of "commerce".
27. Kelley v. Rhoads, 188 U. S. 1 (1903).
28. United States v. Simpson, 252 U. S. 465 (1920). Clarke J., di senting pointed out at
p. 46S that the grant of power to Congress is over conzinerce.
29. In United States v. Hill, 248 U. S. 420 (1919) liquor was carried by a private
individual for his own personal use, but was transported across state lines by a common
carrier. The decision is therefore somewhat less questionable.
30. Covington Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204 (1894).
31. This is so even where there is present neither coercion nor expectation of pecuniary
gain, the mere idea of transportation being sufficient. In Caminetti v. United States, 242
U. S. 470 (1917) there was transportation by means of a public carrier. But in Wilson v.
United States, 232 U. S. 563 (1914) the court had held it immaterial whether or not the
transportation was by a common carrier.
32. Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 95 U. S. 1, 9 (1877).
33. State Freight Tax Case, 82 U. S. 232 (1872).
34. Robbins v. Shelby Taxing Dist., 120 U. S. 489 (1887).
35. Dabnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282 (1921).
36. In Brown v. Maryland, 25 U. S. 419 (1827), Marshall attempted to indicate the
point at which federal control ceased and state control resumed over goods moving in in-
terstate commerce. He argued that the right of importation carries with it the right to
sell the article imported, and that consequentiy, while such goods remain in their original
packages, they'are within federal control. When the articles have become mingled with
and incorporated into the mass of general property in the state, by sale or by breaking
of the original packages, federal regulation ceases.
37. Leisy v. Harden, 135 U. S. 100 (1890) (state statute prescribing conditions upon
which liquor could be imported held a regulation of interstate commerce as applied to sale
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quently a functional approach was necessary for the adjustment of the original
doctrine to the spirit of pertinent statutes.3 8 Thus when the Constitution
stated merely that Congress shall have power to regulate commerce among the
states, it left matters of degree open to future determination, and the reasons
for expansion obviously could not and have not come from the Constitution.
They have come from the Supreme Court. The history of this development
furnishes ample illustration of the truth that "We are under a Constitution,
but the Constitution is what the judges say it is."3 9
The chief question involved in the Schechter Case-whether the effect of
local practices upon the general stream of interstate commerce was direct or
indirect-is not a novel one. The answer of the Court has been a vacillating
process swerving from the ultra-conservative decision in the Sugar Trust Case40
to the liberal holding of the Swift Case4 ' and swinging back again to the re-
actionary rationale of the Child Labor Case.42 In the Sugar Trust Case, the
Court ruled, in interpreting the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, that the particular
combination under attack involved a purely local process, the manufacture of
a commodity, and that consequently the regulatory power of Congress sanc-
tioned by the commerce clause could not be extended to the defendant. How-
ever, nine years later,43 the Court held that a combination organized to acquire
control of two competing railway systems by means of stock purchases was
violative of the Act. 44 The substantial similarity between these two cases is
difficult to ignore. The explanation for the disparity in result is probably to
in original packages by importer); Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U. S. 1 (1898)
(state statute prohibiting sale of oleomargarine held unconstitutional to extent it pro-
hibited importation and sale while in original package). But cf. Austin v. Tennessee, 179
U. S. 343 (1900) (small packages of cigarettes imported in baskets held not original pack.
ages); McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U. S. 115 (1913) (cans of corn syrup removed from
original wooden boxes in which they had been shipped held within federal regulation).
38. However in Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U. S. 511 (1935) Justice Cardozo stressed the
fact that the "Original Package Doctrine" was not an inflexible rule, nor the breaking
of bulk the sole test, and that for some purposes imports still in the original package will
be treated as part of the general mass of property at the state of destination, while on
the other hand the mere breaking of bulk does not necessarily put an end to federal con-
trol.
39. H uGHEs, ADnRESSS (1908) 139.
40. United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1 (1895).
41. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375 (1905).
42. Hammer v. Daggenhart, 247 U. S. 251 (1918).
43. Northern Securities Case, 193 U. S. 197 (1904).
44. The majority reiterated the language of the Sugar Trust Case to the effect that
the Act had no reference to the mere manufacture or production of articles or commodities
within the limits of the States, but added that it embraced every contract, combination
or conspiracy which directly operates in restraint of interstate commerce. The dissent arguing
that the case fell exactly within the holding of the Sugar Trust Case said, at 396: "The
sole contention is that as the result of the ownership of the stock there may arise, In the
operation of the roads, a burden on interstate commerce. That is, that such burden may
indirectly result from the acquisition and ownership."
[Vol. 4
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be discovered in the decided leaning of the Court manifested in a host of
decisions in favor of congressional control of railroads,-the backbone of inter-
state commerce. Nevertheless, in the first Employers' Liability Cases43 the
rule was definitely laid down that even carriers engaged in interstate commerce
do not thereby submit all their business concerns to the regulating power of
Congress. 46
In the Swift Case,47 which dealt with purchases and sales by livestock dealers,
the Court in effect overruled its decision in the Sugar Trust Casi and speaking
through Justice Holmes said, that granting the acts in question were in them-
selves local, they nevertheless were ingredients of a scheme which as a whole
affected interstate commerce.
The same question was again posed, though in a new form in United States
v. Delaware & Hudson Co.48 with regard to legislation forbidding a carrier to
haul in interstate commerce articles or commodities in which it had any in-
terest, direct or indirect.49 In upholding this legislation, the Court recognized
the authority of Congress to control mining, manufacturing and production,
activities which, while inherently local were held to have acquired an interstate
aspect when subjected to the control of carriers. The decision while seemingly
a departure from conservative moorings, was emasculated by the rigid require-
ment of proving a dominating control of the local corporation by the carrier
corporation. The pendulum of conservatism now swung to its full arcF0 in the
decision rendered in the Child Labor Case.0' There the note was struck with
finality that manufacture is not a part of interstate commercer2 and that it
does not become such because of an intention to transport. By a bare majority
the Court reverted to a doctrine whose significance, owing to attacks directed in
45. 207 U. S. 463 (1908).
46. The Court held an Employers' Liability Act unconstitutional on the ground that its
scope was not confined to a master-servant relationship bearing on the direct operation of
interstate commerce. Cf. Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. Co., 295 U. S. 330 (1935);
(1935) 4 FORTUax L. Rnv. 498.
47. In Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U. S. 1, 35 (1923) Chief Justice Taft
paid tribute to the broad outlook and deep significance of this case when he wrote, "That
case was a milestone in the interpretation of the commerce clause .... It recognized the
great changes and development in the business of this vast country. . . . It refused to
permit local incidents of great interstate movement, which taken alone were intrastate, to
characterize the movement as such."
43. 213 U. S. 366 (1909).
49. This was the famous "commodity clause" of the Hepburn Act of 1905. 34 SrT,%.
584 (1906), 49 U. S. C. A. §§ 1, 6, 11, 15, 16, 16(a), 18, 20, 41 (1926).
50. See Powell, Would the Supreme Court Block a Planned Economy (Aug. 1935) 12
Foarou-N 48, to the effect that this case so long as it stands prevents Congress from pro-
hibiting interstate shipment of goods because of elements in the mode of production which
do not affect the inherent quality of the goods.
51. It is interesting to note that this decision was not cited in the Schechter opinion,
although the Government brief devotes several pages to an effort to distinguish the casis.
52. Coe v. Errol, 116 IT. S. 517 (1886).
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the decisions already considered, had been substantially impaired-the doctrine
that interstate commerce begins only with actual delivery to a common carrier
for transportation, or actual commencement of its transfer to another state.63
On the other hand the Court has repeatedly treated the power of Congress
under the commerce clause as operative before any act of transportation has
begun.5 4  The regulation of the buying and selling of grain to be shipped in
interstate commerce is, for example, within the power granted to Congress."
In like manner the business of live stock dealers and commission men in the
principal stockyards of the country has been placed under federal supervision.50
In such cases the sales regulated are clearly local activities but, as the Court
has observed, exchanges and stockyards are not a place of rest or final destina-
tion, they are "but a throat through which the current flows," they are "factors
in the middle of the current of commerce." In the Schechter Case, on the other
hand, the acts complained of, involving selling practices, wages and hours of
labor in the defendants' New York markets, clearly occurred after transportation
had completely ceased and the facts afford no warrant for the argument that
the poultry handled by defendants at their markets was in a "current" or
"flow" of interstate commerce.
Another group of decisions, in addition to those which deal with the tempo-
rarily interrupted "flow" of interstate commerce must be considered. In cases
dealing with carrier regulations57 the Court applied the yardstick of "direct
53. The mere fact that goods are manufactured to be transported and sold in another
state or even segregated for that purpose is not enough to stamp them as subjects of Inter-
state commerce. United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1 (1895).
54. State Freight Tax Case, 82 V. S. 232 (1872); Robbins v. Shelby Taxing Dist., 120
U. S. 489 (1887); Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282 (1921).
55. Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U. S. 189 (1925) (state regulation held void).
In Lemke v. Farmers Grain Co., 258 U. S. 50 (1922) the court having declared the trans-
actions to be beyond the state's powers of regulation, answered the objection that after
loading on cars, wheat might have been sent to local markets or mills, by observing that
the usual course of business was otherwise. In Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U. S. 1 (1923)
which upheld the validity of the Grain Futures Act, the sales were between buyers and
sellers in Chicago but the Court held that these sales affected the price at which grain was
sold throughout the country, thus creating a direct burden on interstate commerce. But cf.
Butler v. United States, 78 F. (2d) 1 (C.C.A. 1st, 1935) (holding AA.A. invalid on
ground Congress has no authority to tax products before entering interstate commerce,
though their production may indirectly affect interstate commerce). -
56. Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495 (1922) (holding the Packers and Stockyards Act
constitutional).
57. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm., 221 U. S. 612 (1911)
(Congress may regulate hours of labor of railway employees engaged in interstate com-
merce since such hours have a direct relation to efficiency of service); Southern Ry. Co.
v. United States, 222 U. S. 20 (1911) (the Safety Appliance Act is not confined exclusively
to vehicles engaged in interstate commerce but covers the same railroad whether engaged
in interstate or intrastate commerce); Mondou v. New York N. H. & H. R, Co., 223 U. S, 1
(1912) (Congress may regulate relations of carriers and employees while both are engaged
in interstate commerce, but only those relations which have a substantial connection
COMMENTS
effect on interstate commerce" liberally, but these decisions and some of their
sweeping statements must be viewed in light of the fact that the subject matter
concerns the very medium of commerce. Furthermore, even as applied to rail-
roads the desired regulation must still operate directly upon interstate commerce
as a whole s
ConcluSion
Viewed in the perspective of constitutional history, the Schechter Case cannot
be regarded as a radical deviation from established doctrine. Rather is it to
be viewed as a redefinition of boundaries, narrowly skirted in many instances,
yet never completely abandoned. Clearly the wages, hours, and selling prac-
tices of an industry at the final and receiving end of the "flow" of commerce
could have been included within those boundaries on only one theory, and that
theory the Court refused to accept. The Government had urged that the
N. I. R. A. was based on the interdependence of every phase of American
economic life, that local wages, for eoxample, generate reverberations in com-
modity prices and purchasing power, which shake the very structure of inter-
state commerceYs But while conceding that modern society "is an elastic
medium -which transmits all tremors throughout its territory"cO the Court par-
ried with the foil that immediacy of causation is the determining factor, and
called touchi with the telling blow that "To find immediacy or directness here
is to find it almost everywhere."0 1
Sweeping though the decision must inevitably appear, its scope must not be
regarded as all inclusive. Clearly excepted from its purview is a vast field of
industrial enterprise. Left open to federal regulation is the entire field of
transportation and communication. 2 Control of the rapidly growing industries
with interstate commerce); Houston, E. & W. Te.as Ry. Co. v. United State:, 234
U. S. 342 (1914) (held constitutional an order made by the Interstate Commerce
Commission that interstate carriers should desist from charging higher rates between specific
interstate than between certain specified intrastate points); Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332
(1917) (in an emergency Congress may prescribe a standard minimum of wages for
employees engaged in interstate commerce to be enforced for a reasonable time); United
States v. Fergen, 250 U. S. 199 (1919) (Congress has power to prohibit and punish the
forgery and utterance of fictitious bills of lading).
58. Cf. First Employers Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463 (1903); Railroad Retirement
Board v. Alton R. Co., 295 U. S. 330 (1935); (1935) 4 FoSDmHr L. RE,. 498.
59. Cf. "Primitive conditions have passed; business is now transacted on a national
scale." Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 211 (1930) quoted in
Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U. S. 378, 402 (1933).
60. AL.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 76 F. (2d) 617, 624 (C.C.A. 2d,
1935).
61. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 55 Sup. Ct. 837, 853 (1935).
62. See Fuchs, A Postscript-The Schechter Case (1935) 20 ST. Louis L. Rn,. 297 for
a discussion of activities over which federal regulation may nevertheless hold sway.
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of aviation and radio communication is assured. 3 So too, myriad transactions
which concededly exert a direct effect on interstate commerce. But the decision
stands as a warning signal that the integrity of state lines will be zealously
guarded lest "the federal authority . . . embrace practically all the activities of
the people and the authority of the State over its domestic concerns.., exist only
by sufferance of the federal government. '6 4
RELrEF FOR MISTAKE OF LAw.-Firmly embedded in the fields of quasi-
contracts' and equity2 is the principle that relief will be afforded against the
consequences of a material mistake of fact. That the rule denying relief
where the mistake is of law remains in sharp contradistinction is clearly
indicated by several recent decisions.3
In the realm of the law of crimes and torts there exists a conclusive pre-
sumption that every man knows the law. Hardly anyone would question its
necessity for the adequate administration of justice.4 The application of this
conclusive presumption to cases where the object sought is the prevention of
unjust gain by another is directly attributable to the decision of Lord Ellen-
b6rough in the famous case of Bilbie v. Lumley.u In that case quasi-contrac-
tual recovery of money paid upon an insurance policy, with full knowledge
of the facts, but under the mistaken belief that the facts constituted no legal
defense, was denied upon the express ground that the mistake was of law.
This conclusion was reached in direct contravention of several earlier decisions,
63. Powell, Would the Supreme Court Block a Planned Economy (Aug. 1935) 12 Fon-
rtuN 48, suggests that goods within the Original Package Doctrine may likewise be ex-
cepted from the scope of the Schechter decision.
64. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 55 Sup. Ct. 837, 850 (1935).
1. 3 WrLIsToN, CoNTRACts (1920) § 1574; WOODWARD, QUAsr-CoNTRAMOS (1913) § 11.
Of course, the mere existence of a mistake of fact is not sufficient for relief. The retention
of the benefit conferred by reason of the mistake must be inequitable.
2. 2 Po FRoy, EQurrY JuRIsPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) § 852.
3. Standard Oil Co. of Ky. v. Gramling, 160 So. 725 (Ala. App. 1935); Jordan v.
Johns, 79 S. W. (2d) 798 (Tenn. 1935); State v. Perlstein, 79 S. NV. (2d) 143 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1935); Alderson v. Gauley Fuel Co., 178 S. E. 626 (V. Va. 1935); see New York
City Employees' Retirement System v. Eliot, 267 N. Y. 193, 200, 196 N. E. 23, 25 (1935).
4. A conclusive presumption of knowledge of the law is unquestionably necessary In
criminal law and torts. The result of allowing a plea of mistake of law in these fields
can well be imagined. Naturally, no one's rights would be safe were the plea of mistake
of law allowed.
5. 2 East 469, 102 Eng. Reprints 448 (K. B. 1802). It is submitted that recovery
here could have been denied upon the ground that the plaintiff owed at least a moral
obligation, thus rendering retention by the defendant not against conscience.
An explanation for Lord Ellenborough's decision possibly may be found in the fact
that he received his early training in criminal trials. See 2 WrlLXsToN, CONTRACTS § 1581.
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